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Abstract
The number of smartphones and tablets as well as the volume of traffic generated by these devices has been
growing constantly over the past decade and this growth is predicted to continue at an increasing rate over the
next five years. Numerous native features built into contemporary smart devices enable highly accurate digital
fingerprinting techniques. Furthermore, software developers have been taking advantage of locational
capabilities of these devices by building applications and social media services that enable convenient sharing of
information tied to geographical locations. Mass online sharing resulted in a large volume of locational and
personal data being publicly available for extraction. A number of researchers have used this opportunity to
design and build tools for a variety of uses – both respectable and nefarious. Furthermore, due to the
peculiarities of the IEEE 802.11 specification, wireless-enabled smart devices disclose a number of attributes,
which can be observed via passive monitoring. These attributes coupled with the information that can be
extracted using social media APIs present an opportunity for research into locational surveillance, device
fingerprinting and device user identification techniques. This paper presents an in-progress research study and
details the findings to date.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Modern electronic technologies enable various types of surveillance activities such as phone wiretapping, video
surveillance, cellular tower-based movement tracking, and implementation of databases for storage, aggregation
and processing of various types of digital surveillance information (Marwick, 2012). These databases may be
utilised by law enforcement organisations, commercial entities and individuals with nefarious objectives to
collect and analyse large amounts of data, sometimes as many as 2 terabytes of textual content per day
(Alberton, 2012; Hannay & Baatard, 2011). The more personal information is shared publicly on the Internet,
the easier it becomes to exploit this information (Timm & Perez, 2010).
A recent Internet traffic report suggests a 70% volume growth in 2012 (Cisco, 2013). The same report also
indicates that the volume of mobile traffic in that year was around twelve times the volume of the entire Internet
traffic in 2000. In addition, Cisco (2013) also predict that mobile traffic originating from smartphones and
tablets will yield a compound annual growth rate of 81% and 113% respectively between 2012 and 2017, with
the worldwide number of smartphone and tablet subscribers growing constantly at the same time (Meeker &
Wu, 2013). It is arguable that smartphones and tablets are being used as a primary means of Internet access by a
significant portion of their users (Brunty, Helenek, & Miller, 2012).
When it comes to identification and tracking in the digital world, numerous research efforts have focused on
being able to link digital traces to device users (Shavers, 2013; Takeda, 2012; Wilkinson, 2012). Omnipresent
mobile devices with wireless network connectivity leak data on their own (Humphreys, 2011; Kramer & Haines,
2010; Takeda, 2012). Unintentionally or by design, these devices expose information that can be used to track
their users (Lincoln, 2013; Storm, 2013). This information, combined with the data publicly available through
social media application programming interfaces (APIs), could be utilised to facilitate multichannel digital
surveillance techniques. This paper presents an in-progress study on acquisition and aggregation of various
types of electronic surveillance information. The primary objective of the study is to determine whether public
locational data from selected social media channels can be combined with digital fingerprints and wireless
signals through the development of a consistent collection technique that delivers a number of digital locational
surveillance artefacts.
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FINGERPRINTING AND TRACKING OF SMART DEVICES AND THEIR USERS
Contemporary smartphones and tablets come equipped with a variety of features, which commonly include but
are not limited to:







Speakers and microphone
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interface
Bluetooth
Locational capability based on a combination of Global Positioning System (GPS), Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) and WLAN
Web browser
Ability to install and run third party mobile applications (apps)

In 2012, the predicted number of GPS-enabled handsets – 560 million – was expected to be more than three
times than in 2007 (Crawford & Goggin, 2009, p. 101). It is anticipated that around 30% of apps available via
the current major distribution platforms – the App Store and Google Play (previously known as the Android
Market) by Apple and Google respectively – potentially rely on the ability to access user location (Apple, 2013;
Google, 2013). While there has been a slight decrease in the number of apps that require locational capabilities,
the number of apps that may access this data is still significant (Lookout, 2013).
Smart Device Fingerprinting
The features provided by modern smartphones and tablets facilitate a wide range of software and hardware
fingerprinting techniques. In essence, device fingerprinting is used to derive a unique identifier via means of
monitoring and processing selected externally observable characteristics (Desmond, Yuan, Pheng, & Lee,
2008). These characteristics range from low-level attributes, such as internal clock skews, to higher-level ones,
such as viewport resolution and installed system fonts (Eckersley, 2010; Kohno, Broido, & Claffy, 2005).
Ultimately, the aim of digital fingerprinting is to provide the basis for subsequent tracking with the potential to
connect the fingerprint to a real identity (Mowery, Bogenreif, Yilek, & Shacham, 2011).

Figure 1. Conceptual framework for device fingerprinting and user tracking
Figure 1 depicts the selected features of smartphones and tablets that enable various digital fingerprinting
methods. A number of fingerprinting approaches based on the characteristics of the WLAN interface have been
found to be highly reliable (Desmond et al., 2008; Kohno et al., 2005). Also, in a paper titled “Blueprinting”,
Herfurt and Mulliner (2004) suggested a fingerprinting approach based on hashing of attributes disclosed
through the Service Description Protocol (SDP) profiles. Simply searching for Bluetooth devices in the
immediate vicinity can uniquely identify a certain percentage of nearby devices that have been configured as
detectable (Takeda, 2012). Specialised tools such as Ubertooth One, deployed across a number of locations can
facilitate tracking of people carrying Bluetooth devices, even if they are not discoverable but are actively
transmitting (Ossmann, 2012).
Hardware sensors built into smartphones can also be used for fingerprinting purposes. Due to the peculiarities of
the sensor manufacturing process that leads to minor performance differences, data from accelerometers based
on micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) can be used to create unique digital fingerprints with 96%
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accuracy (Dey, Roy, Xu, & Nelakuditi, 2013). A novel fingerprinting approach based on smartphone speakers
and microphones also suggests that manufacturing imperfections can enable audio-based fingerprinting with
90% accuracy (Das, Borisov, & Caesar, 2014).
Fully featured browsers with JavaScript support pre-installed on smart devices can also be used to create
fingerprints based on a variety of disclosed characteristics, such as the user agent string, screen resolution and
installed plugins and fonts (Eckersley, 2010). For instance, the user agent string that is sent with every
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request contains an array of useful characteristics that can be used to
identify the specifics of the client platform down to the minor version of the underlying operating system.
However, while the user agent string alone is fairly effective, it can be easily spoofed. Therefore, successful
browser fingerprinting techniques often rely on a combination of both browser and system-dependent attributes
(Boda, Földes, Gulyás, & Imre, 2012). It has also been suggested that analysing the JavaScript browser engine
conformance using readily available complex test suites can be used to identify a particular browser type and
version with negligible overhead (Mulazzani et al., 2013). Furthermore, the “canvas” element defined in the
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) 5 specification enables the creation of reliable fingerprints via the means
of pixel extraction from rendered fonts and images (Mowery & Shacham, 2012).
Frequently, the developers of mobile apps rely on the ability to transfer personal information to remote service
endpoints to personalise the user experience and deliver additional features (Huber, Mulazzani, Schrittwieser, &
Weippl, 2013). A certain volume of network traffic is generated when these apps interact with server endpoints
via the exposed APIs. When direct traffic analysis is possible, interactions with specific service endpoints can be
identified with 80% accuracy in a matter of seconds, with higher accuracy resulting from longer traffic
inspection sessions (Zhang, He, Liu, & Bridges, 2011). In addition to server API endpoints, mobile apps often
interact with remote cloud storage, as well as advertisement and analytics services providers. Cumulatively,
these network packet traces form the basis for subsequent generation of a combined app network profile (Dai,
Tongaonkar, Wang, Nucci, & Song, 2013). Unfortunately, the uniqueness of these profiles greatly depends on
the distinctiveness of network behaviour exhibited by an app meaning analysing two different apps that utilise
the same APIs will result in analogous profiles. Even when traffic eavesdropping is not possible,
communication request timing and volume measurements can be used to create fingerprints with more than 90%
accuracy (Huber et al., 2013).
This paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive coverage and presents the fingerprinting aspect at the
conceptual level. It should also be noted that certain techniques could be applied to deceive the described
fingerprinting methods, such as using a slightly modified browser engine that facilitates randomisation of
external characteristics (Nikiforakis, Joosen, & Livshits, 2014).
Locational IEEE 802.11 Wireless Surveillance
Multiple security researchers have taken advantage of the 802.11 specification by focusing on implementing
tools that enable locational wireless surveillance (Goodin, 2012; O’Connor, 2013; Seiwert, 2012; Wilkinson,
2012; Wuergler, 2012). Specifically, projects such as Snoopy and CreepyDOL exploit the fact that wirelessenabled devices periodically scan for previously connected Wi-Fi networks. These scans are referred to as the
“probe requests” that consist of a number of mandatory data attributes, which are transmitted in plan text (Gast,
2005).
Two of the transmitted data attributes are of particular interest – the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and the Source
Address (SA), otherwise known as the media access control (MAC) address. The SSID value can be used to
determine what network the device is probing for and, thus, was previously connected to. While it can be
spoofed, the MAC address generally uniquely identifies the device. Relying on probe requests is effective
because users might often leave Wi-Fi enabled on their devices for convenience of access (Wilkinson, 2012).
This is not surprising considering that the primary Australian telecommunications retailer has announced plans
to roll out one of the world’s largest networks with more than 8,000 additional wireless hotspots (Turner, 2014).
In what is described as a trial of new technology for collection of aggregated footfall data, a dozen probe request
sniffing bins were placed in central London and collected over 4 million probe requests and over 500,000
unique MAC addresses in a week (Hamill, 2013). The creators of Snoopy disclose having collected almost
80,000 unique MAC addresses in less than a day at a crowded public location. A similar people movement
tracking technology has been utilised by a major Australian retailer (Battersby, 2013). Other researchers have
used probe requests to uncover offline social networks and track visitors at mass events (Barbera, Epasto, Mei,
Perta, & Stefa, 2013; Bonné, Barzan, Quax, & Lamotte, 2013; Cunche, Kaafar, & Boreli, 2012).
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Adding the geographic location as an additional data attribute is made possible by incorporating the GPS
capability into the collecting sensors (Wilkinson, 2012). Furthermore, it is possible to infer the geographic
location of the networks being probed for based on the SSID using a freely available online service ("WiGLE:
Wireless Geographic Logging Engine," 2013). It should be noted that the future ability to track smart devices
manufactured by Apple via the means of passive probe request sniffing may be limited with the introduction of
MAC address randomisation during network scanning, which is expected to be built into the upcoming iOS 8
(Hutchinson, 2014; Stites & Skinner, 2014). At the time of writing, the presence and exact behaviour of the
proposed privacy-enabling change has not been confirmed based on the available iOS 8 beta distribution (Cox,
2014). Nevertheless, the potential change in network probing behaviour of future iOS-based devices further
highlights the significance of multi-protocol surveillance and tracking techniques.
Social Media-Based Locational Tracking
Major social networking services have been taking advantage of locational capabilities of smart devices by
allowing and encouraging users to ‘geotag’ the uploaded content or simply share their location (Hannay &
Baatard, 2011). In essence, ‘geotagging’ can be described as labelling of online content with geographic
coordinates of the originating location (Crawford & Goggin, 2009; Joshi, Gallagher, Yu, & Luo, 2012).
Having access to geotagged data means that not only it is possible to identify the individual data source and the
time of creation, but also the place of origin (Hannay, 2009). Data collected over a period of time can be
analysed for patterns and exceptions, which could provide insights into more than what the original author had
intended to share (Espinhara & Albuquerque, 2013; Hannay & Baatard, 2011; Oculus, 2013; Omand, Bartlett,
& Miller, 2012; Trottier, 2012). Geotagged public data presents and additional layer of intelligence through the
prospect of developing comprehensive locational profiles on individuals (Valli & Hannay, 2010). In fact, device
manufacturers themselves are known for building locational tracking capabilities into their products. For
instance, the Motorola Droid X2 phone has been discovered to contain a potential location-reporting component
codenamed “Little Sister” (Lincoln, 2013). Furthermore, location-aware devices based on iOS 4 have been
known to passively maintain a local database of user movements in an unencrypted format (Cheng 2011).
Finally, having access to the complete set of individual locational data may not even be necessary, as some
researchers suggest that as little as four unique spatiotemporal points are needed to identify 95% of individual
mobility patterns (de Montjoye, Hidalgo, Verleysen, & Blondel, 2013).
Mass sharing of personal information publicly also presents new opportunities to commit conventional crimes
through social engineering, spear phishing, identity theft, defamation, cyber-bullying and other activities that
can lead to damaging and fatal acts (Brunty et al., 2012; Espinhara & Albuquerque, 2013; Hill, 2012; Jacobson
& Idziorek, 2012; Timm & Perez, 2010).

SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH
Turnbull and Slay (2008) proposed the use of wireless network signals as a source of digital evidence and
suggested the need to develop specialised technical collection processes. Furthermore, Turnbull, Osborne, and
Simon (2009) examined the legal and technical implications of using wireless signals for evidential purposes
and suggested that collection mechanisms would need to operate with minimal interaction, provide accuracy and
repeatability and function in accordance with all applicable legal requirements.
Device fingerprints coupled with spatiotemporal information can be used to suggest the answers to the “who
(which device), where, and when” questions. Reliability classification of digital locational evidence has been
proposed by Hannay (2013), which further highlights this potential. In a similar vein, Minnaard (2014) suggest
that residual probe request traces left in volatile memory of access points may be of potential forensic value,
especially in remote locations.
This study focuses on the low-level aspects of collecting and processing of the relevant data attributes and ways
to develop a consistent collection technique that meets the aforementioned requirements. Furthermore, it is
expected that additional attributes and protocols will be incorporated into the study or subsequent works.

RESEARCH METHOD
Research Questions
The research consists of two parts and will aim to seek answers to the following research questions:
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1.

Can a consistent collection technique be developed for acquisition of geotagged social media data and
wireless signals?

2.

Can the content and characteristics of freely available geotagged data be mapped to a standard set of
attributes?

Research Design
This is an exploratory empirical study that employs a multi-method approach based on systems development
and experimentation. A functional prototype will be required to conduct the experiments. To shorten the initial
prototype development phase, an existing tool – Snoopy – will be examined and its architecture extracted as the
basis for subsequent prototyping. Snoopy has already been used in production across a variety of disperse
geographical locations, and has further been enhanced as a proprietary tool that can support a number of
protocols and physical deployment models (Goodin, 2014). The source code of the original Snoopy proof of
concept, as well as its successor – Snoopy-ng – is publicly available. The latter uses an improved modular
framework and provides a number of additional data collection plugins. Both versions are functional and are
considered an appropriate basis for architecture extraction and reuse.
Once available, the prototype will be used to conduct laboratory experiments involving multiple devices and
participants. The experimentation is expected to feed into the iterative process of architecture validation,
systems refactoring and conceptual framework alignment as part of answering the research questions.

PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT
Logical Architecture
At the time of writing, the initial conceptual, logical and execution architecture specifications have been
developed. The execution architecture has been created on the basis of Snoopy through source code analysis and
isolated experimentation. The resulting multilayer logical architecture is presented Figure 2.

Figure 2. Logical architecture
The capture layer is responsible for facilitating the capture of the required data attributes. It has been broken
down into two components – device sensors and public data extractors. The former is responsible for the
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acquisition of surveillance-enabling data attributes transmitted by smart devices over various number of wireless
communication protocols, such as 802.11. The latter is responsible for the extraction of locational public data
and metadata using the available APIs.
The storage and processing layer is made up of the central Database Management System (DBMS) back-end
and a number of processing agents that turn the raw captured data into usable surveillance artefacts. The layer is
broken down into three components to represent the data transformation process facilitated by the processing
agents. It is also anticipated that raw data may be captured and sent over to the data store in a variety of different
formats. Using the raw captured data as input, the agents apply the relevant processing logic to produce the
required surveillance outputs, which are stored in the central DBMS in a structured format. The data extractor
components from the capture layer can also be considered a special subclass of processing agents, which have
been separated into the capture layer due to their designated purpose. Extraction of public data does not occur
en-masse and is generally triggered when relevant identifiers are discovered in the raw data sets.
Finally, the presentation layer includes two components that are responsible for delivering the derived
surveillance artefacts to their consumers. The user interface component is responsible for web-based data
presentation to real users. The integration interface is responsible for API endpoint provisioning to facilitate
integration with other systems, so that this solution can be used as a building block of a larger structure.
Custom Sensor Prototype
At the time of writing, a custom sensor prototype based on a Raspberry Pi and a number of third-party add-ons
is in the initial stages of the implementation. Specifically, in this context, the study aims to develop a
specification for a low-cost portable, extensible and easily constructible sensor that can support the
incorporation of additional components in the future.

CONCLUSION & ONGOING RESEARCH
The omnipresent smartphones and tablets come equipped with a wide range of features that facilitate a variety
of reliable digital fingerprinting and locational tracking techniques. In addition, the proliferation of social media
services resulted in vast amounts of personal geotagged information publicly available online. These sources of
locational and other data can be used as a basis for the development of digital surveillance techniques and
potential collection of digital evidence.
At this stage of the study, the sensor prototype development phase has been initiated and will be followed by
experimentation to answer the stated research questions. While the original scope of the proposed study is
limited to 802.11 wireless signals and publicly available social data and metadata from selected providers, the
derived conceptual framework for fingerprinting of smart devices suggests the need to consider other features
and protocols. This need is expected to result in a subsequent scope expansion or will be addressed through
additional future research.
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